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Security Auditor — validates the security.txt file that tells researchers how to report a vulnerability, and verifies its OpenPGP signature when it has one.

Reporting channel

People who find a flaw can reach you through a contact that is current and usable.

Integrity

A signed file is checked for changes, so reports are not quietly sent somewhere else.
security.txt is a small plain-text file, standardized as RFC 9116, that says where to report a vulnerability and until when that information is valid.

How it works

  1. Find the file — GET https://{host}/.well-known/security.txt, then https://{host}/security.txt if the first answers HTTP 404 or 410. Both always use HTTPS, whatever the audited URL uses. A certificate problem is not retried without validation, because readers trust this file. Any other answer means the auditor cannot tell whether the file exists, so the result is ERROR, not FAIL.
  2. Check how it is served — HTTPS, text/plain and charset=utf-8.
  3. Read the fields — Contact, Expires and Canonical. Field names are case-insensitive and # lines are comments. In a signed file, only the signed block is read: anything outside it is reported, never trusted.
  4. Verify the signature — when the file is signed, the auditor downloads the keys named in up to three https: Encryption fields, verifies the signature and checks the key is not revoked or expired.
  5. Specification pin — every run emits 37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-100 (INFORMATION) naming RFC 9116.
Each rule reports its finding or, when it passes, its own SUCCESS check. A rule whose subject is absent reports nothing: the signature rules do not run on an unsigned file, for example.
What the signature check proves. Without Expected key fingerprint, it proves the file matches the key the site publishes, not that the owner signed it: someone who controls the site can replace both the file and the key. Set the preference to detect that, and to detect a signature that was removed.

What it audits

Every row maps to one checkRule* outcome and one CheckCode.

Output documentation

Preferences

Risks and considerations

Lost reports

  • Without a working contact, people who find a flaw guess at an address or post it publicly, and you learn about the problem late or from someone else.
  • An expired file tells readers the details may be stale, so they may not use them at all.

Tampering

  • An attacker who can change the file can send vulnerability reports to themselves and learn about flaws before you do.
  • A signature only covers the signed block. Standard tools still report a good signature when text is added around it, so this auditor treats that text as a finding.
  • Removing the signature leaves a file that looks ordinary, which is why an unsigned file fails when a fingerprint is expected.

Signing key

  • Encryption is meant for encrypting reports, so it may not hold the signing key. In that case the signature cannot be checked, which is a WARNING, not a sign of tampering.
  • A signed file must be re-signed whenever Expires changes.