> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.37audits.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Security.txt Auditor

> Validates the security.txt file and checks that its signature has not been tampered with

> [!NOTE]
>
> **Security Auditor** — validates the `security.txt` file that tells researchers how to report a vulnerability, and verifies its OpenPGP signature when it has one.

> [card] Reporting channel
>
> People who find a flaw can reach you through a contact that is current and usable.

> [card] Integrity
>
> A signed file is checked for changes, so reports are not quietly sent somewhere else.

[`security.txt`](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9116) is a small plain-text file, standardized as RFC 9116, that says where to report a vulnerability and until when that information is valid.

## How it works

1. **Find the file** — GET `https://{host}/.well-known/security.txt`, then `https://{host}/security.txt` if the first answers HTTP 404 or 410. Both always use HTTPS, whatever the audited URL uses. A certificate problem is not retried without validation, because readers trust this file. Any other answer means the auditor cannot tell whether the file exists, so the result is `ERROR`, not `FAIL`.
2. **Check how it is served** — HTTPS, `text/plain` and `charset=utf-8`.
3. **Read the fields** — `Contact`, `Expires` and `Canonical`. Field names are case-insensitive and `#` lines are comments. In a signed file, only the signed block is read: anything outside it is reported, never trusted.
4. **Verify the signature** — when the file is signed, the auditor downloads the keys named in up to three https: `Encryption` fields, verifies the signature and checks the key is not revoked or expired.
5. **Specification pin** — every run emits `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-100` (`INFORMATION`) naming RFC 9116.

Each rule reports its finding or, when it passes, its own `SUCCESS` check. A rule whose subject is absent reports nothing: the signature rules do not run on an unsigned file, for example.

> [!WARNING]
>
> **What the signature check proves.** Without **Expected key fingerprint**, it proves the file matches the key the site publishes, not that the owner signed it: someone who controls the site can replace both the file and the key. Set the preference to detect that, and to detect a signature that was removed.

## What it audits

Every row maps to one `checkRule*` outcome and one `CheckCode`.

| CheckCode | Status | When it fires | Recommendation | Why it matters |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-100` | `INFORMATION` | Always. Records the specification this auditor implements. | — (recommendation is `null`; nothing for the site to change) | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-416` | `FAIL` | `failDays` is not below `warningDays`; no request is made. | On the auditor's Configuration tab, set `failDays` below `{warningDays}`, or raise `warningDays` above `{failDays}`. | Until the warning threshold is above the fail threshold this audit cannot tell a warning from a failure, so it does not judge the file. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-101` | `INFORMATION` | The file has no signature, which RFC 9116 allows. | Sign it with an OpenPGP cleartext signature if you want readers to be able to verify it. | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-400` | `FAIL` | Neither `/.well-known/security.txt` nor `/security.txt` exists (HTTP 404 or 410). | Publish a file at `{wellKnownUrl}` with at least Contact and Expires. | People who find a flaw have no reliable way to tell you, so reports get lost or go public. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-201` | `SUCCESS` | The file was found. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-300` | `WARNING` | The file is only at the legacy `/security.txt` path. | Move it to `{wellKnownUrl}`, or redirect that path to it. | Tools and researchers look in /.well-known first and may conclude you have no reporting channel. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-202` | `SUCCESS` | The file is at `/.well-known/security.txt`. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-401` | `FAIL` | The request ended on plain HTTP after a redirect. | Serve the file over HTTPS without redirecting to `{finalUrl}`. | Over plain HTTP anyone on the network can change the address that reports go to. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-203` | `SUCCESS` | The file is served over HTTPS. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-402` | `FAIL` | The answer is not `text/plain`, usually an HTML page. The field and signature rules do not run. | Serve the file as text/plain; if this is an HTML error page, publish the real file. | A page that is not plain text usually means an error page answered, so readers and tools find no contact details. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-204` | `SUCCESS` | The file is served as `text/plain`. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-301` | `WARNING` | `Content-Type` does not declare `charset=utf-8`. | Send Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8. | Without the charset, tools may read non-ASCII contact details incorrectly. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-205` | `SUCCESS` | `Content-Type` declares `charset=utf-8`. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-403` | `FAIL` | The file has no `Contact` field. | Add a Contact line with a mailto: or https: address. | Contact is the reason the file exists; without it, a report has nowhere to go. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-206` | `SUCCESS` | The file has at least one `Contact` field. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-404` | `FAIL` | A `Contact` value is not a usable mailto:, tel: or https: URI. One check per value. | Replace `{value}` with a valid mailto:, tel: or https: URI. | A contact that cannot be used loses the report, and you never learn about the flaw. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-207` | `SUCCESS` | Every `Contact` value is valid. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-405` | `FAIL` | The file has no `Expires` field. | Add an Expires line less than a year ahead, such as `{example}`. | Without a date, readers cannot tell whether the details are still monitored and may not trust them. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-208` | `SUCCESS` | The file has an `Expires` field. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-407` | `FAIL` | The file has more than one `Expires` field. | Keep exactly one Expires line. | With conflicting dates, readers cannot tell which applies, so the file looks unreliable. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-210` | `SUCCESS` | The file has one `Expires` field. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-406` | `FAIL` | `Expires` is not an RFC 3339 date-time. | Use the form 2027-11-04T00:00:00Z instead of `{value}`. | An unreadable date makes tools treat the file as invalid, so your contact details may be ignored. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-209` | `SUCCESS` | `Expires` is an RFC 3339 date-time. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-408` | `FAIL` | The `Expires` date has passed. | Review the contacts and set Expires to a new date; the current value is `{date}`. | An expired file tells researchers not to trust it, so reports may never be sent. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-211` | `SUCCESS` | The `Expires` date has not passed. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-415` | `FAIL` | The file expires in `failDays` days or fewer, and has not expired yet (default 7). | Renew it now, before `{date}`; a signed file must also be re-signed. | The file is about to be treated as stale, and renewing it takes someone's time, so reports may stop reaching you before it is done. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-223` | `SUCCESS` | The file expires in more than `failDays` days. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-302` | `WARNING` | The file expires in more than `failDays` and at most `warningDays` days (default 8 to 30). | Renew it before `{date}`; a signed file must also be re-signed. | Once the date passes, the file is treated as stale and reports may stop reaching you. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-212` | `SUCCESS` | The file expires in more than `warningDays` days. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-303` | `WARNING` | `Expires` is more than a year ahead. | Set Expires under a year ahead and review the file when it comes up. | Far-off dates mean the file is rarely reviewed, so it can list people who no longer handle reports. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-213` | `SUCCESS` | `Expires` is less than a year ahead. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-304` | `WARNING` | The file lists `Canonical` URLs and was not fetched from one of them. | Add `{url}` as a Canonical line, or serve the file only from those URLs. | The standard says not to trust a file served from an address it does not list, because it may have been copied or moved. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-214` | `SUCCESS` | The file was fetched from one of its `Canonical` URLs. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-414` | `FAIL` | **Expected key fingerprint** is set and the file is unsigned. | Restore the signed file, or clear the preference if signing has stopped. | Removing a signature is the simplest way to alter a signed file without detection. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-409` | `FAIL` | The file has a PGP block that cannot be parsed. | Re-create it with gpg --clearsign. | A broken signature gives readers no way to tell a damaged file from a tampered one. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-216` | `SUCCESS` | The PGP block could be read. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-411` | `FAIL` | Text sits before or after the signed block. | Remove the unsigned text, then find out how it got there. | Text outside the block is not covered by the signature, so it can add a false contact while the signature still verifies. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-218` | `SUCCESS` | Nothing sits outside the signed block. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-305` | `WARNING` | The signed file has no `Canonical` field. | Add Canonical: `{url}` and re-sign the file. | Without Canonical, a validly signed file can be copied to another site and still look genuine. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-215` | `SUCCESS` | The signed file has a `Canonical` field. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-501` | `ERROR` | A key URL failed (timeout, HTTP 5xx, HTTP 403), so the signature could not be checked. | Make `{keyUrl}` reachable and re-run the audit. | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-306` | `WARNING` | The signing key is not at any https: `Encryption` URL. `dns:` and `openpgp4fpr:` URIs are not fetched. | Publish the signing key at an https: URL in an Encryption line. | Without the public key, nobody can check that the file is genuine, so the signature proves nothing. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-221` | `SUCCESS` | The signing key was found. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-412` | `FAIL` | **Expected key fingerprint** is set and the signature does not establish that key as the signer, including when the signer's key cannot be found. | Confirm the key change was intended, then update the preference, or restore the file. | A different key means someone other than your expected signer produced this file. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-219` | `SUCCESS` | The file was signed by the expected key. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-410` | `FAIL` | The signature does not match the file's content. | Find out who changed the file; restore it or re-sign it with key `{fingerprint}`. | The file changed after it was signed. Someone may have altered it to divert vulnerability reports. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-217` | `SUCCESS` | The signature matches the file's content. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-413` | `FAIL` | The signing key has been revoked. | Sign the file with a current key and publish that key. | A revoked key may be compromised, so its signature no longer shows the file is genuine. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-220` | `SUCCESS` | The signing key is not revoked. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-307` | `WARNING` | The signing key has expired. | Extend the key or sign with a current one. | Verification tools may reject an expired key, so readers can no longer confirm the file is genuine. |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-222` | `SUCCESS` | The signing key has not expired. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-200` | `SUCCESS` | No rule failed or warned. | — | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-500` | `ERROR` | The file could not be fetched (timeout, TLS or certificate error, or any HTTP status other than 2xx, 404 or 410), so whether it exists is unknown. | Make `{url}` reachable and re-run the audit. Last error was `{error}`. | — |
| `37A-SecurityTxtAuditor-502` | `ERROR` | The **Expected key fingerprint** preference is not a 40 or 64 character hex fingerprint. | Enter the full key fingerprint, for example from gpg --fingerprint. | — |

## Output documentation

| Status | Description | Test logic |
| - | - | - |
| **INFORMATION** | Context only; does not change overall status | The specification pin (`100`) on every run, and `101` when the file is unsigned. |
| **SUCCESS** | The file is valid and current, and any signature verified | No rule failed or warned. Each passing rule has its own code (`201`–`223`) and `200` summarizes the run. |
| **WARNING** | The file works but something should be reviewed | Legacy path (`300`), no charset (`301`), expires in more than `failDays` and at most `warningDays` days, 8–30 by default (`302`), expires too far ahead (`303`), Canonical problems (`304`, `305`), signing key missing or expired (`306`, `307`). |
| **FAIL** | The file is missing, unusable or shows signs of tampering | Missing (`400`), not HTTPS (`401`), not plain text (`402`), Contact or Expires problems (`403`–`408`), signature problems (`409`–`414`), `failDays` days or fewer left, 7 by default (`415`), `failDays` not below `warningDays` (`416`). |
| **ERROR** | The auditor could not finish the check | The file (`500`) or a key (`501`) could not be fetched, or the fingerprint preference is invalid (`502`). |

## Preferences

| Preference | Type | Default | Effect |
| - | - | - | - |
| **Fail threshold (days)** (`failDays`) | integer | `7` | The audit fails when the file expires in this many days or fewer (`415`). An expired file always fails (`408`). |
| **Warning threshold (days)** (`warningDays`) | integer | `30` | The audit warns when the file expires in this many days or fewer, beyond the fail window (`302`). Must be higher than `failDays`; otherwise the audit fails with `416` before any request. |
| **Expected key fingerprint** (`expectedKeyFingerprint`) | string | empty | Full fingerprint of the key that must sign the file, from `gpg --fingerprint`. Spaces, case and a `0x` prefix are ignored. When set, another signer is a `FAIL` (`412`) and an unsigned file is a `FAIL` (`414`). |

## Risks and considerations

### Lost reports

* Without a working contact, people who find a flaw guess at an address or post it publicly, and you learn about the problem late or from someone else.
* An expired file tells readers the details may be stale, so they may not use them at all.

### Tampering

* An attacker who can change the file can send vulnerability reports to themselves and learn about flaws before you do.
* A signature only covers the signed block. Standard tools still report a good signature when text is added around it, so this auditor treats that text as a finding.
* Removing the signature leaves a file that looks ordinary, which is why an unsigned file fails when a fingerprint is expected.

### Signing key

* `Encryption` is meant for encrypting reports, so it may not hold the signing key. In that case the signature cannot be checked, which is a `WARNING`, not a sign of tampering.
* A signed file must be re-signed whenever `Expires` changes.


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